Abstract: A sound and complete semantics is given for sequential, depth-rst logic programming with a version of negation as failure. The semantics is logical in the sense that it is built up only from valuation functions (multi-valued logic interpretations in the style of Fitting and Kunen) and logically-motivated equivalence relations between formulas. The notion of predicate folding and unfolding with respect to a program (Tamaki, Sato, Levi et al.) and the universal notion of \disjunctive unfolding" (Andrews) are important elements of this semantics.
Introduction
Sometimes it is possible to take a seemingly non-logical feature of a logic programming system, and give it a more logical interpretation by extending our traditional notions of semantics. In And90, And91] it was shown how this can be done for the depth-rst, leftto-right strategy of sequential Prolog. In this paper, those results are made more abstract, and extended to a system having a form of negation as failure. The main new elements added are a fourth truth value (to go with true, false and unde ned) and a set of special constants which act as a logical analogue of free variables.
This paper also contains the clearest description so far of a style of semantics which could be called \congruential", which was latent in the proof-theoretic descriptions of And90, And91] and was developed further in And92]. The general method behind this semantics is to characterize a restricted class of query/program pairs with a compositional, logical valuation function, and then to characterize wider classes of queries and programs with the use of congruences (syntactically compositional equivalence relations) between formulas.
A pleasant feature of congruential semantics is the economy of mathematical notions it uses: it is built up almost exclusively from notions of term, formula, truth value, valuation, and congruence between formulas.
Handling of Negation
The ideal situation in logic programming would be to have a highly logical declarative semantics of programs, and a practical operational semantics, with a powerful negation, which is sound and complete with respect to it. However, it is generally agreed that we must compromise on some of these requirements to stay within the logic programming paradigm. The compromise taken here is to use a relatively weak negation, but to try to maintain the rest of the ideal.
The particular form of negation considered in this paper is what could be called \insist-on-ground negation as failure": it computes a goal :G by the regular negation-as-failure (NAF) method only if G is ground, and terminates query processing immediately with an error indication if G is not ground. This is preferable to the unsound negation of most Prologs for some applications, but Naish points out Nai86] that even the slightly more liberal form of NAF used in IC-Prolog gives the error indication frequently. More useful is the form of NAF in which the call to :G is delayed until G is ground Dah80, Nai84] .
However, it is theoretically interesting that this form of negation can be given a logical semantics based on a four-valued logic. The four truth values are T (true), F (false), U (unde ned), and N (\ oundering on negation", needed to help characterize the other truth values). They are arranged in the following total order to give a semantics to the existential quanti er:
The ordering is not on \degree of truth" but rather on \degree of computational priority"; so the four truth values do not have the same structure as in, for instance, Belnap's four-valued logic Bel75] . Assisting in the logical characterization of the negation are an in nite number of \spe-cial constants". These constants act as logical stand-ins for unbound variables in the truthfunctional semantics, allowing a logical interpretation of the groundness condition. Essentially, if a query ounders, then the special constants allow for some \ground" instance of it to ounder as well. The operational semantics is extended to take account of the special constants for theoretical purposes, but they are not needed in the usual query evaluation process.
The operational semantics within which the negation is situated is sound and complete with respect to the declarative, and uses the usual top-down, depth-rst search strategy of most Prolog interpreters. This makes it somewhat more practical for general-purpose logic programming than proposals for negation which need a bottom-up and/or breadthrst strategy for completeness. Floundering can be avoided in practice by, for instance, requiring that variables inside negations be input-mode. However, note that the semantics given here is complete for all queries and programs, and thus in particular any restricted subset of queries and programs.
Unfoldings and Congruences
In some sense, all the big problems in logic programming semantics come from the presence of recursive predicate de nitions. The approach of this paper to handling this aspect of the semantics is based on the following observation:
If goal G succeeds (fails) with respect to a program P, then there is some unfolding of G which is true (false) in the Clark equality theory CET Cla78].
Usually we speak of the unfolding of a program TS84], but when we generalize the notion of goal to include equalities (interpreted consistent with CET) and connectives, we can unfold goals as well. The positive part of the Clark completion Cla78] of P is read as the speci cation of a fold/unfold congruence = P between formulas (rendering irrelevant its falsehood or inconsistency as a set of formulas). We can thus use = P and the semantics of goals with respect to the empty program to de ne the semantics of goals with respect to P.
Example. Let P consist of the two clauses \even(0):" and \even(s(s(x))) even(x):" Then the positive completion of P, compl(P), is even(y) $ (y = 0) _ 9x(y = s(s(x))&even(x)) Therefore the rst unfolding of :even(s(0)) is :((s(0) = 0) _ 9x(s(0) = s(s(x))&even(x))) which is true even with respect to the empty program. These ideas are closely related to those used by Levi et al. Lev88, GL92] , who de ne the \unfolding semantics" of a program via the limit of the process of unfolding the program. These ideas allow us to sidestep the problem of asymmetry of success and failure in the least-model and xpoint semantics by viewing the process of unfolding as central.
Organization of This Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic de nitions. Section 3 gives the operational semantics which will act as a reference point for the declarative semantics. Section 4 gives the declarative semantics, in three parts: the semantics of a restricted class of goal formulas with respect to the empty program, the semantics of general goals with respect to the empty program, and the semantics of general goals with respect to general programs. Section 4 also gives proofs of relative soundness and completeness of the two semantics. Section 5 discusses various issues, such as the logicalness of the semantics and the characterization of variant forms of negation. Section 6 discusses this work in the context of previous work, and Section 7 gives conclusions and suggestions for future work.
Basic De nitions
De nition 2.1 A rst-order language L consists of a countably in nite set X(L) of variable names, a nite set F(L) of function symbols f i each with an associated arity n i 0, and a set P(L) of predicate names p j each with an associated arity m j 0.
In the sequel we will assume the existence of some xed rst-order language L with equality = as the language of all programs. We will also assume the existence of a countably in nite set S of \special constants". Terms in L and S are built up from the variables and special constants in the usual way with the function symbols. We will use x, y as metavariables standing for variables, p for predicates, and s, t for terms, all possibly subscripted.
In order to express the logical connectives more clearly, we will work with a syntactic generalization of goals and programs, in the style of Miller et al. MNPS91] . It should be clear that this is no loss or gain of power over the usual clausal form.
De nition 2.2 A goal formula G of a language L is a formula built up from the following BNF syntax: G ::= (s = t) j p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) j G&G j G _ G j 9xG j :G A formula is ordinary if it contains no special constants.
A clause (de ning p) in a language L is a formula of the form p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) G, where G is ordinary, or of the form p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ).
A program is a nite sequence of clauses.
We will use G, A, B, C as meta-variables standing for goal formulas, and P for programs, all possibly subscripted.
We will not be concerned so much with the original form of a program as with its positive Clark completion Cla78].
De nition 2.3 Let C be a clause in program P. Let cc(C; P) be de ned as: 9y 1 : : :y n (x 1 = t 1 ; : : :; x n = t n )&G, if C is of the form p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) G, and 9y 1 : : :y n (x 1 = t 1 ; : : :; x n = t n ), if C is of the form p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) where y 1 ; : : :; y n are all the free variables of C, and x 1 ; : : :; x n are the rst n variables not appearing in P.
Let p be a predicate name and P be a program containing clauses de ning p. Let cd(p; P) be the expression p(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) $ cc(C 1 ) _ _ cc(C m ), where C 1 ; : : :; C m is the sequence of clauses in P de ning p, and x 1 ; : : :; x n are the rst n variables not appearing in P.
Then the positive Clark completion of P, compl(P), is the set fcd(p 1 ; P); : : :; cd(p k ; P)g, where p 1 ; : : :; p k are all the predicates de ned in P.
Note that for simplicity we assume all predicates are de ned with the same arity in P. Also, while the original Clark completion does not refer to the sequence of clauses in P, here we modify the de nition slightly to insist that the sequence of clauses in P be preserved in the sequence of cc expressions in cd(p; P).
De nition 2.4 A equivalence relation is a binary relation which is re exive (A A), symmetric (if A B then B A), and transitive (if A B and B C then A C).
A congruence (between goal formulas) is an equivalence relation = such that: De nition 2.5 The fold/unfold congruence associated with a program P, = P , is the least congruence such that for every predicate de nition p(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) $ G in compl(P), we have that p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) = P G x 1 := t 1 ; : : :; x n := t n ] 
Operational Semantics
To specify precisely what kind of logic programming system we are talking about, I give here a formal operational semantics SPN (Sequential Prolog with Negation) for the system. SPN is basically SLD-resolution for our general goals and programs, streamlined for the desired left-to-right and negation strategies.
SPN is actually an abstract interpreter, since the only observable it characterizes is which of four general outcomes results from the computation of a goal: T, meaning that the computation returns at least one answer substitution; F, meaning that the computation fails nitely; U, meaning that the computation has oundered upon trying to call a non-existent predicate (which is closely related to divergence, as we will see); and N, meaning that the computation has oundered on negation on a non-ground subgoal. This form of operational semantics is the most convenient for the purposes of proving equivalence with the truth-functional semantics. It omits mention of the returned answer substitution, and does not characterize the nding of more than one substitution; however, it could easily be modi ed to characterize these observables.
SPN Derivations as Proofs
To explain computations in SPN, it is perhaps more convenient to look on them rst as proofs of statements, in analogy with formal mathematical proofs.
Like a formal proof, a \computation" of SPN is a tree of \judgements", written rootdown, with only certain allowed con gurations of child nodes (premisses) to parent node (conclusion). (The use of formal systems to express operational semantics was rst studied extensively by Plotkin Plo81] .) The allowed con gurations of premisses and conclusion are given by proof rules; SPN's are given in Figure 1 . A particular judgement J is considered to be proven if there is a tree, built according to the rules, with J at the bottom and only axioms (zero-premiss rules) at the top.
In SPN, judgements are expressions of the form ( : ) P ) , where is a substitution 
SPN Derivations as Computations
Judgements in SPN can also be seen as describing the computation steps followed by an interpreter computing a list of subgoals. To compute a query G relative to program P, we let be the empty substitution and be the sequence consisting of the single formula G, and we try to nd a such that (() : G) P ) is provable. In our example, if we were trying to nd a such that (() : 9x((x = 2_x = 3)&:p(x))) ) , we could tell that the rule at the bottom of the computation would have to be 9. The form of that rule completely determines the form of the substitution and goal stack in its premiss (modulo the unimportant choice of variable name), so we can reduce the problem of nding to that of nding the outcome of ((y = 2 _ y = 3)&:p(y)), and then to that of nding the outcome of y = 2 _ y = 3; :p(y). At this point, we have a choice of rules (_1 or _2); but the choice depends only on the outcome of (() : y = 2; :p(y)). Therefore we can reduce the problem to nding that outcome, knowing that we may have to do another subsidiary computation afterwards.
This general pattern of nding the outcomes to subsidiary computations is followed throughout the computation. In essence, we proceed around the entire outline of the proof, going up the left side and then down the right side of branches, until we get back to the root. (See Figure 3. ) Of course, not all computations terminate; for those that do not, no complete proofs exist, only fragmentary ones whose topmost judgements are not axioms. This corresponds to the situation of keeping doing subsidiary computations forever, without ever nding their outcomes.
Truth-Functional Semantics
In this section, I describe the semantics which is the main contribution of this paper. The semantics uses the two logical notions of valuation and congruence. These interact to produce a precise characterization that neither notion alone can achieve.
Consider valuation; but when they appear as the left-hand half of a conjunction whose right-hand half is 2 = 3, they yield di erent truth values. Thus a faithful v cannot be truly compositional. One way to make v more compositional would be to map goals onto denotations that were more complex than just truth values; but that would make the semantics less logical and more functional than if we used valuations.
It is also possible to identify certain logical and operational equivalences between formulas: for instance, whenever we replace any subformula (B 1 _B 2 )&C by (B 1 &C)_(B 2 &C), we get the same result, even in left-to-right search. But we cannot build up a semantics based on such congruences alone, since we would like to de ne the behaviour of 9xB in the traditional logical fashion, in terms of the behaviour of all its instances B x := t].
As this paper shows, however, if we use an interacting collection of valuations and congruences, we can preserve much of the compositionality and logical avour that each construct gives. The approach to the present problem is in three stages. In the rst, we give a valuation on a subclass of goal formulas which characterizes their behaviour with respect to the empty program ;. In the second, we de ne a congruence which relates all other goal formulas to this subclass, still with respect to ;. Finally, we show that the fold/unfold congruence = P associated with a program P allows us to characterize the behaviour of all goals with respect to P.
In this section, the crucial de nitions will be put into framed boxes in order to facilitate reading. v(t = t) = T; v(s = t) = F, where s is not identical to t; v(p(t 1 ; : : :; t n )) = U; 
First
v(B&C) = ( v(C) if v(B) = T, v(B) otherwise; v(B _ C) = ( v(C) if v(B) = F, v(B)
Examples
The treatment of insist-on-ground negation is perhaps the most subtle aspect of the valuation v. The key is the way in which an existential formula is assigned a truth value which is the maximum, under the t ordering, of the truth values of its instances. An existential formula receives an N truth value (that is, v considers the query to ounder on negation) if and only if at least one of its instances receives N. Consider the following table. k is a special constant.
Consider :x = 2 and :x = x. For both of these formulas, one instance returns the N sign, which (because of its position at the top of the order of truth values) makes the existential closure return N as well. Now consider the k (special constant) instance of the formula (x = 2&:x = 3). We still have that v(:k = 3) = N; but v(k = 2) = F, and because of the behaviour of v on &, the truth value of the instance is F. Essentially, the early, failing subformula \protects" the truth value of the entire formula from being pushed upwards by the N, because of the asymmetric treatment of & by v.
The only time that the truth value of the entire k instance will not be protected from an N subformula is when either the variable in question does not participate in any equations, or else is uni ed only with itself or with other uninstantiated variables. This is because equations like k = k (a k instance of x = x) receive a T truth value, causing v to get its nal value from the rest of the formula. Thus we have that v(9x(x = x&:x = 2)) = N.
Note that uni cation with another, uninstantiated variable also works as we would like. The uninstantiated variable still raises the error condition, as it would in the operational semantics; however, if the uninstantiated variable or anything it is uni ed with is later instantiated, the error condition is not raised. Here is another, similar table, where j and k are special constants: 
Properties
The operational semantics SPN is sound and complete with respect to the valuation v, when the goal is an O formula and the program is empty. We will prove this by a technique which involves looking only at ground queries.
There are four technical lemmas we will need before we proceed. I will just state them here, and prove them in an appendix. The statements of the lemmas all have to do with \logical" behaviour in SPN computations, such as the behaviour of substitutions and conjunctions. First is a lemma that states that we can add irrelevant information to the substitution in a computation without a ecting the result. Next is a lemma which is at the heart of the approach to the proofs used here. The basic result is this. Say a negated-disjunction formula B has a free variable x, and the computation of B as a goal results in . Then is exactly the maximum, under the t ordering, of the outcomes of the closed instances of B. To prove this, we need to generalize to many variables so that we can do an inductive proof. 
2
Using these lemmas, we can proceed with the proof of characterization. We will prove the two directions separately. Case 9xB. Because we have assumed that G is outer-disjunctive, this G must be a negated-disjunction (N) formula. We can therefore apply the Existential Lemma. 
Second Stage: General Queries, Empty Program
For the next stage, we de ne a congruence = du on general goal (G) formulas, and show that congruent goals have the same outcome with respect to ;. We then show that every goal formula is = du -congruent to an O formula, and de ne the semantics of G formulas with respect to ; accordingly. = du is just the congruence induced by the disjunctive unfolding operation of And91].
The Disjunctive Unfolding Congruence
The disjunctive unfolding congruence is an equivalence relation between formulas which is intended to relate pairs of formulas only if they have the same operational outcome.
De nition 4.11 = du , the disjunctive unfolding congruence between formulas, is the least congruence such that: congruence, however, does preserve operational outcome, as we will see later.
To prove that the disjunctive unfolding congruence preserves operational outcome, it is convenient to de ne a relation which holds between formulas which are only \one step apart" in the congruence.
De nition 4.12 G . The base case, 0, is trivial. For the inductive case, it su ces to prove the result when only one . du step has been performed; the rest follows by the induction hypothesis.
Thus we will prove the result when the two goal stacks di er by only one . du step. We will do this by induction on the size of the rst computation. Proof. If G has a key subformula B _ C, we will always be able to apply a . du operation to its key subformula. (This is the case even if B _ C is the right-hand conjunct of a conjunction, since the left-hand conjunct must be an N formula.) Each repetition of the while loop, however, increases the number of nodes in the tree of the formula, but not the height or branching factor of the tree. Since trees with xed height and branching factor have bounded size, the process must terminate. The result will be a formula with no disjunctions which are immediate subformulas of & or 9 subformulas; in other words, an O formula.
2
The equivalence class G] of a formula G under = du therefore consists of formulas which are closely related to each other syntactically, and which all have the same operational outcome. Moreover, the last theorem shows that at least one formula in G] is an O formula. Since we know that v is a faithful valuation on O formulas, we know that we can get the operational outcome of any formula in G] by applying v to the O formula in G]. De nition 4.19 The fold/unfold congruence associated with a program P, =P , is the least congruence such that for every predicate de nition p(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) $ G in compl(P), we have that p(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) =P G x 1 := t 1 ; : : :; x n := t n ] = P has the property of preserving operational outcome with respect to program P, as = du does with respect to the empty program. To prove this, it will again be convenient to de ne a relation which relates goals which are \one step apart" in the = P congruence.
Proof. O(G) is disjunctive-unfolding-congruent to G. By the fact that = du preserves operational outcome, (() : G) ) i (() : O(G)) ) . By the Characterization
De nition 4.20 Let Proof. The G 0 i formulas can be obtained from the G i formulas by zero or more . P steps or their inverses. The proof is by induction on the total number of . P steps used.
The base case, 0, is trivial. For the inductive case, it su ces to prove the result when only one . P step has been performed; the rest follows by the induction hypothesis. Thus we will prove the result when the two goal stacks di er by only one . P step. We will do this by induction on the size of the rst computation. Again, the base case (1 judgement in the computation) is easy: the rule is either =2 or :3, and neither is a ected by the change. 
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We must now prove that every goal G has a P-unfolding G 0 which has the same outcome with respect to the empty program that G does with respect to P. We prove a generalization of this, for induction purposes. 
v P precisely characterizes the outcome of all ground goals, not just with respect to the empty program now, but with respect to P. The following theorem is the culmination of all our work, and shows that v P can be taken as the denotation of P. So v P is faithful to the operational outcome of queries evaluated under P. Note that if we just know that v P (G) = U, we cannot tell whether G would diverge, or terminate returning U. However, if G and P contain no references to predicates not de ned in P, the situation is more clear. Under that reasonable assumption, v P (G) = U i G diverges, and v P (G) 2 fN; T; Fg i G terminates returning that truth value.
Note that although the result refers only to ground goals, this is no real limitation. Whenever we give a goal to a Prolog system, we intend that any free variables in it be implicitly existentially quanti ed. It is a simple corollary that For all goals G and programs P: (inflist(z) ). Let G k be the result of doing k unfoldings of inflist(z). We have that v(G k z := t]) = U for all t which are lists of length > k, but v(G k z := t]) = F for all other t. Now because F t U, we have that v(9z(G k )) = U. This holds for all k. But there is therefore no unfolding G of 9z(inflist(z)) such that v(G) is anything other than U, so v P (9z(inflist(z))) = U, as desired.
Discussion

Recursive Enumerability
The valuation v P , the denotation of P, is the only valuation in this paper which is not a total recursive function. v is recursively de ned on the structure of its argument, and v The fact that the earlier stages v and v 0 are total recursive is an appealing feature of this congruential semantics, since it suggests we have \factored out" the non-recursivelyenumerable elements into the last stage.
Logicalness of Characterization
The three-stage characterization given here inherits its logicalness from the congruences and valuations used in its construction. It would be better if we could collapse some of the stages together, for instance by internalizing the predicate unfolding stage within the valuation; but this seems impossible to do cleanly, in part because of the Clark-AndrekaNemeti anomaly.
The logical avour of the congruences comes from the following fact:
). The proposition is true because the congruences only ever replace subformulae by subformulae which are equivalent in the models of compl(P). Thus, looking at a goal for the moment as a rst-order formula, by unfolding predicates and taking the disjunctive unfolding of the resulting formula, we are simply tranforming the goal into an equivalent formula.
After unfolding predicates and disjunctions, we are applying a non-standard valuation function v to the result. If we replaced v by the standard rst-order three-valued intuitionistic valuation (e.g. based on Kripke's theory of truth Kri75]), we would get a v P which simply re ected the truth of the formula in models of the positive completion of P. However, although our v is non-standard, it is compositional, and the valuation of an existential formula is the truth maximum of the valuations of all its instances. Indeed, ignoring the left-to-right treatment of the binary connectives and the special treatment of special constants, v is identical to the standard valuation with respect to the least model of the Clark Equality Theory (CET Cla78]).
Finally, the de nition of v P (G) in terms of v 0 (G), k , and =P is logical in the sense that we are nding the \most de ned" truth value of a certain set of formulae equivalent to the original formula, where our notion of de nedness follows standard treatments in multi-valued logic. It would be better if we could de ne v P (G) in a way that was fully compositional with respect to the structure of G; but several counterexamples (such as the one given at the start of section 4) suggest that this is not possible.
In particular, let P once again be the Clark-Andreka-Nemeti paradoxical program AvE82] inflist(f(x)) inflist(x) The least model of this program contains no instance of inflist(y), so 9y(inflist(y)) is not entailed by it; and yet no top-down interpreter can deduce that the query inflist(y) should fail, although top-down interpreters are complete for success. (Analogous problems arise with the \gap" between T P # ! and the least xpoint of T P # in xpoint semantics and Kripke-Kleene semantics Fit85].) So if we de ned v P (9y(inflist(y))) in a fully compositional way, as the truth maximum (max t ) of the set fv P (inflist(t)) j t is a ground termg, we would erroneously conclude that the query failed.
In contrast, inflist(y) is given the operationally correct \unde ned" truth value in the congruential semantics in this paper, since there is no unfolding of it with a de ned truth value. It seems that a correct valuation function for depth-rst Prolog must go through some kind of unfolding stage before applying a compositional valuation function.
Other Negation Strategies
Many practical programs can be computed without oundering in the operational semantics described here, since negated atoms in clauses often correspond to tests done on ground terms. However, it would still be preferable to be able to characterize other, more complete negation strategies, such as delaying negation Dah80, Nai84] , and it may appear that we could do so with a simple modi cation of the semantics given here. Unfortunately, this appears not to be the case; only a simple variant, in which oundering closures are discarded and new closures allowed to succeed or fail, seems easily characterizable.
For instance, it may appear that we can characterize delaying negation by modifying 
Absence-of-De nition as Failure
The approach to failure used in the operational semantics here is only one of several that could be taken. I have commented above on the idea of considering oundering to be a kind of failure; the absence of a de nition for a predicate could also be taken as a kind of failure. If we were to try to model this view of failure in the semantics, we would have to make some modi cations. Here is one approach to modifying the semantics; others are possible. First, we would modify the operational semantics so that absence of de nition is considered as failure (resulting in the F truth value). Second, we would modify the de nition of predicate unfolding with respect to a program so that an unde ned predicate call is \unfolded" into false. Third, we would have a second operational semantics which considers all predicate de nitions to be unde ned (resulting in truth value U). Finally, all results phrased in terms of the empty program would have to be phrased in terms of the second operational semantics.
These modi cations would somewhat weaken the homogeneity of the semantic structure. They are also not entirely necessary if our only goal is to model the behaviour of a Prolog system; many Prolog systems consider lack of de nition to be a compile-time or run-time error, to be dealt with outside the execution model per se.
Comparison to Previous Work
Here I discuss the relationship of the semantics in this paper to previous work. The most relevant previous work to consider is in the areas of semantics of depth-rst Prolog, semantics of negation, and unfolding semantics. , there is also a great deal of metatheoretic encoding going on in them. For instance, the uni cation algorithm, which is more properly a part of the operational semantics, is encoded and represented in the high-level semantics.
Many writers JM84, AB87, DM88, dBdV89, NF89, Bau92] have constructed denotational semantics for depth-rst Prolog. These attempts make valuable connections between logic programming semantics (even accounting for unsound negation) and general programming language semantics. But it is somewhat disappointing that denotations of logic programs are given as functions from inputs to outputs, when a major point of the logic programming paradigm is that programs do not have to be viewed in this way.
Logical Approaches
In contrast to the metatheoretic and denotational approaches, the declarative semantics in this paper is built from three logical basic elements:
A valuation function v which formalizes our intuitive notions of Clark equality, left-toright conjunction and disjunction, and insist-on-ground negation, and which gives a semantics for free variables via the Tarskian \witness" interpretation of the existential quanti er; A congruence = du which formalizes some intuitively clear logical and operational equivalences between goals; and A class of congruences = P which formalizes our intuitive notion of predicate de nition. The technical results of soundness and completeness depend on the exact way in which these elements are de ned and made to interact; the appeal of the semantics, like those of However, there is an important distinction to be made here. These researchers are working with the notion of strong or universal termination. A query is said to strongly terminate if all branches of its SLD-tree are nite; that is, if it either succeeds returning a nite number of solutions and then stopping, or else fails. If we consider only strong termination, we do not need to consider the left-to-right search strategy of Prolog, since a query strongly terminates i it does so with respect to any search strategy. The notion of termination considered here is more general, in the sense that we consider a query to terminate successfully if it returns at least one solution. We can recapture strong termination by noting that a query G strongly terminates i the query (G&false) fails.
Note also that these researchers are taking variable modes into consideration in their work, thus going beyond the scope of this paper. They are also exploring practical methods for proving termination, which I have not attempted to touch on.
Recently, St ark St a94] has published a semantics for depth-rst Prolog with negation which covers some of the same ground as And93b]. St ark's method is to translate a Prolog program into a new program in which each predicate is translated into three predicates: one corresponding to success, one corresponding to failure, and one corresponding to lefttermination of the original predicate. However, St ark avoids the problem of characterizing oundering on negation by insisting that programs meet a mode criterion which guarantees that no queries ounder. The semantics of this paper is more general in the sense that even programs which do not meet this mode criterion and return non-oundering results can be characterized.
Negation
The corpus of literature on semantics of negation is massive, and I will not try to summarize it here; an excellent overview is given by Harland Har92] . Brie y, the semantics given here di ers from previous work in: not restricting the form of programs, as opposed to the strati ed and locally strati ed schemes, and related approaches; assuming the top-down processing which is common in practice, as opposed to the bottom-up processing assumed by the perfect, stable, well-founded or tight Wal93] semantics; and in considering the depth-rst processing of queries which is common in practice, as opposed to most approaches. It also varies in style from most approaches by adopting the congruential framework rather than treating programs as collections of formulas in a least-model-or xpoint-like framework.
Naturally, the issue of using top-down and depth-rst processing is irrelevant if we set aside the issue of completeness of the operational semantics, as for instance Fitting Fit85] and Kunen Kun87] do. But one of the main goals of this paper has been to give a logical and operational semantics which are sound and complete with respect to each other. In general, the bene t of the unfolding technique is the same: it factors out the problem of predicate expansion, allowing us to characterize the behaviour of recursive programs in terms of non-recursive programs. We thus avoid the problem of the Clark-Andreka-Nemeti anomaly (as pointed out earlier), and achieve a symmetric characterization of success and failure.
Conclusions and Future Directions
I have presented here a sound and complete semantics for depth-rst Prolog with a weak but logically sound form of negation. The major elements of the semantics are valuations (functions from goals to truth values) and congruences (syntactically compositional equivalence relations). Since both the valuations and the congruences are logically motivated, the semantics has a highly logical avour.
The techniques used in this paper are intriguing, and may be able to be applied to other commonly-used features of practical Prologs. Examples include other mode-dependent features such as predicate variables, var and nonvar, and dynamic type checking. An extension of the unfolding techniques used here may also result in a semantics for negation within extensions of Prolog such as hereditary Harrop formulas MNPS91]. I have recently extended the work in this paper to take account of the Prolog \cut"; a preliminary version of this work appears in And95].
In addition, other forms of negation within logic programming might be amenable to similar analysis. I am presently looking at negation in nondeterministic semantics, ICProlog-style negation, and (with Ver onica Dahl) delaying negation. 
A Proofs of Technical Lemmas
This appendix contains the proofs of the four technical lemmas stated in Section 4.1. Case :3. For every free variable in B which is a member of V , we can substitute a special constant not found in B and the e ect will be the same. Case :4. Since B contains no free variables, no can a ect its computation. There- Case :3. = N, so this case cannot occur with the assumptions of (EX2-4). Case :4. Assuming 6 = N as per (EX2-4), we must have = U; that is, we only need prove (EX3). Since B contains no free variables, no can a ect its computation. 
